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Abstract
As political elections are becoming more expensive, judicial elections are also following
this trend. This project focuses on elections at the state supreme court level. There are
three different methods used to select state supreme court justices, which are: partisan,
nonpartisan, and merit selections. The intent of this project is to provide an empirical
analysis of the differences in amounts raised between judicial selection methods. This
will be done by examining the amount of money that is raised by state supreme court
candidates in Ohio, compared to Florida. Ohio is a state that uses partisan elections,
while Florida uses the merit system. By empirically showing that more money is raised in
a state that uses partisan elections, this serves to supplement and strengthen the
existing research regarding the differences in amounts raised between judicial selection
methods.
I: Introduction
Constitutionally states have been free to adopt any method they deem appropriate to
select judges, and states have chosen multiple methods to do this. The three most popular
selection methods are partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and merit selections. The
purpose of this project is to examine the amount of money raised by state supreme court
candidates running in two different selection methods. The results of this project will serve to
highlight the differences in amounts raised between the various selection methods. For my
analyses, I chose to examine elections in Ohio and Florida for several different reasons. Both
states have the size and popularity to have attention drawn to their judicial elections.
Additionally, Ohio uses partisan elections and Florida uses a form of the merit system. By
selecting these two states, it allows for a comparison between the fundraising of candidates
from different selection methods. Judicial elections at the federal level are stagnant, but there
is greater freedom at the state level to experiment and adopt different methods. A brief outline
of the historical backgrounds between Florida and Ohio, illustrates this freedom in judicial
selection.
2

Florida Election System
In 1845, Florida’s State Supreme Court justices were elected by the state legislature to
five-year terms. The state then transitioned to directly electing their judges in 1853. Moreover,
in 1861 Florida began to have the governor appoint supreme court justices with consent from
the senate. This system reverted back to having justices directly elected by the people in 1885
and that remained the method of selection until 1971. This is when Florida’s legislature
established nonpartisan judicial elections, and Governor Askew made an executive order calling
for the use of nominating commissions to fill judicial vacancies1. This was their first step in
adopting the merit system. Finally in 1976, voters approved a constitutional amendment that
implemented merit selection and retention elections in the state2, which is their current
system.
Ohio Election System
Ohio on the other hand, has been more resistant to change over the years. In 1802,
Ohio started off by having both houses of the general assembly chose their judges. This method
was in place until 1850, when Ohio first began to have direct elections for judges. In 1912 Ohio
held a Constitutional Convention, which made judicial elections in the state officially
nonpartisan. Since then there have been several attempts to implement a merit system in the

1

History of Florida’s judicial selection process available at

<http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/formal_changes_since_inception.cfm?state=>
2

Ibid.
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state, but all attempts have failed3. Ohio has a hybrid election system, which includes a partisan
primary and then a nonpartisan general election4. While Ohio is officially a state with
nonpartisan elections, most literature classifies it as having partisan elections, due to its
partisan element.
Now that the different historical backgrounds of these states have been shown, I must
delineate the increasing importance that has been placed on money in judicial elections. Even
with various attempts for reform like those tried in Ohio, judicial elections have become
increasingly politicized in recent years5. With this increase in politicization, judicial races have
also become more competitive6. As politicization and competitiveness have increased, money
used in these elections has also followed this rising trend. This has caused groups that have
vested interests in the outcomes of these elections to contribute large sums of money. These
groups include: lawyers, lobbyists, businesses, interest groups, political parties, and labor
unions; all of which are groups that regularly appear before the very justices that they
3

In 1938 and 1986, voters defeated proposed amendments to Ohio’s Constitution that would have implemented

merit selection for state supreme court judges.
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Michael E Solimine, Carolyn Chavez, Thomas Pulley, and Lee Sprouse, Judicial Selection In Ohio: History, Recent

Developments, and An Analysis of Reform Proposals. Report of the Center for Law and Justice at the University of
Cincinnati College of Law, September 2003. History of Ohio’s judicial selection process available at
<http://www.lwvohio.org/assets/attachments/file/JUDICIAL SELECTION IN OHIO_ HISTORY, RECENT.pdf>
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Joanna Shepherd, Justice at Risk an Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions. American

Constitution Society (2013), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20%28FINAL%29%206_10_13.pdf
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contribute to. This dynamic between judges and their contributors has given rise to a growing
suspicion of the judicial election process7. An analysis conducted by Shepherd confirmed that
judges are in fact influenced by the contributions they receive8. A majority of the research
examining this issue was conducted before two major Supreme Court decisions. While certainly
still relevant, cases such as Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and Citizens United v. FEC
have dramatically changed the landscape of campaigning in judicial elections9. These cases, in
addition to the recent large increase in campaign funding, have made it more essential than
ever to examine the relationship between money and judicial elections.
II: Background
In order to have a better understanding of the relevant terms and a full scope of the
issue, reviewing the literature is necessary. I will start by further defining and examining the
different methods used in judicial elections. Then transition into a review of the cases that have
significantly impacted, and transformed judicial elections into what they are today. Lastly, I will
review the data surrounding money in these elections. By bringing in quantitative metrics, this
will show some of the practical implications and the profound effect that it has on campaigns.
This review will serve as a basis for deeper insight into the many aspects surrounding judicial
elections.
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groups and justices’ voting in favor of business interests.
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Judicial Elections
The Framers of the Constitution in selecting judges at the federal level opted for
presidential appointment with advice and confirmation by the senate, with lifetime tenure for
all federal judges. This model was thought to be the method of judicial selection most
conducive to an independent judiciary and the preservation of the rule of law10. In describing
the rationale for the judiciary set up by the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist
No. 78 explained the need for an independent judiciary with lifetime tenure. Stating “If, then,
the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent
tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit
in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty” (1788).
He further asserted “that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against
the effects of occasional ill humors in the society” (1788)11.
When the Constitution was ratified, most judges at the state-court level were either
appointed by their legislature, or by the governor with legislative confirmation12. However,

10

Diane Sykes, Independence v. Accountability: Finding a Balance Amidst the Changing Politics of State-Court

Judicial Selection. Marquette University Law Review (2008) Vol. 92 No. 341. Available at
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1309&context=mulr
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Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm
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John L. Dodd, Christopher Murray, Stephen B. Presser, Mark Pulliam, Alfred W. Putnam, Paula M. Stannard, The
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during Andrew Jackson’s presidency, there was a shift in thought concerning the manner in
which judges should obtain their positions. During this time, Jackson was a large proponent of
direct democracy and the states began to adopt this mindset13. The focus went from judicial
independence to judicial accountability, with the prevailing notion being that if judges were
insulated from accountability, it would likely lead to an unresponsive judiciary14. Scholars have
also put forward reasons such as judges needed to be more responsive to their communities15
and that the judiciary needed more independence from state legislatures16 as to why states
decided to adopt elections during this time.
From this, partisan and nonpartisan elections emerged. In partisan elections, candidates
typically run in an initial primary to gain nomination. Once nominated, candidates stand in the
general election, in which party affiliation is indicted on the ballot17. However, these elections
were not to the satisfaction of everyone. In 1906, the famous legal scholar Roscoe Pound was

13
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Laura Zaccari, Judicial Elections: Recent Developments, Historical Perspective, and Continued Viability. Richmond

Journal of Law and the Public Interest (2004) Vol. 8 No. 1.
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Charles H. Sheldon, Linda S. Maule, Choosing Justice: The Recruitment of State and Federal Judges. The American

Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 2 (June 2000) pp. 446-468.
17

American Bar Association Coalition For Justice, Judicial Selection: The Process of Choosing Judges. Available at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/JusticeCenter/Justice/PublicDocuments/judicial_selecti
on_roadmap.authcheckdam.pdf
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quoted saying “putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians, in
many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench”18.
In light of criticism from Pound and others, pressure to reform partisan elections began
to gain traction. The most popular reform method that surfaced was nonpartisan elections.
These are contested elections that may include a primary and general election, but voters are
unable to see a judicial candidate’s party affiliation on the ballot19. Even with nonpartisan and
partisan elections, concerns remained with the states about the effectiveness of these
methods. Politics were still believed to be a part of the process because candidates were
required to campaign for office, and doubts began to rise about the abilities of voters to cast
informed ballots in nonpartisan elections20.
Due to these concerns, the American Judicature Society pushed for another reform of
judicial selection that combined the positives of all selection systems, naming it the merit
system21. While there are subtle variances from state to state, several aspects are standard in

18

Roscoe Pound, Speaking at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, reading a paper entitled The

Causes of Popular Disaffection with the Administration of Justice, 1906. Available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437704909.html
19

Ibid. at 17.
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Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections. New York University, available at

http://www.nyupress.org/webchapters/0814740340chapt1.pdf
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Ibid. This system is also known as retention elections and the Missouri Plan, as Missouri was the first state to

adopt it in 1940. These terms are used interchangeably, but for purposes of this project, I will stick with merit
system.
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this selection method. A nominating commission screens and selects the most qualified
candidates for a judicial vacancy, and then typically the governor appoints one of the
recommended candidates to the bench for a specified term. The nominating commission is a
group of impartial individuals, typically appointed by the governor of the state in accordance
with the state’s Bar Association. Once the judge’s term is up, they are then subject to a
retention election. The incumbent’s name is placed on the ballot and voters have two choices.
Either vote yes and retain the judge, or vote no and declare the position vacant. Most states
require a simple majority for retention of the position. If a seat is declared vacant, a new
candidate is then appointed by using this same system22. This system seeks to combine judicial
independence (judges do not have to run against an opponent) with judicial accountability
(they still face the possibility of being removed for their decisions)23.
Florida utilizes the merit system by having their governor appoint a candidate from a list
of three to six names that are selected by a judicial nominating commission. At the conclusion
of their six year term, they are then subject to a retention election24. In contrast, Ohio has a
hybrid system which consists of a partisan primary, followed by a nonpartisan general
election25. Across the country in the selection of justices to their highest state court, nine states

22

Merit system definition Ibid at 17.

23

Ibid at 20.

24

Florida Supreme Court, Merit Retention & Mandatory Retirement of Justices of the Supreme Court. Available at

http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/justices/merit.shtml
25

Ibid at 4.
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use partisan elections and twelve states use nonpartisan elections26. In twenty-nine states, the
governor or legislature appoints the justice, with twenty-four of these states using some form
of the merit system27. The breakdown of all states by which method they utilize can be
observed from the chart below.

28

26

Justice at Stake. Your State National Map available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/state/index.cfm
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Landmark Cases
There are two main landmark cases that have significantly transformed and shaped
judicial elections into what they are today. The first case took place in 2002, entitled Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White29. The next case took place in 2010, entitled Citizens United v.
Federal Elections Commission30. These cases in conjunction with each other have had a huge
impact on campaigns and elections, and require further examination to see their full
significance.
Prior to the decision in White, Minnesota, like many other states had laws to regulate
the speech of judicial candidates seeking election. These laws consisted of provisions that
precluded justices from announcing their positions on issues that could potentially come before
them, and from making pledges or promises of conduct outside of faithful and impartial
decisions while in office31. The issue that came before the Supreme Court in White was the
constitutionality of a provision in Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited a
candidate running for judicial office from announcing their views on disputed legal or political

29

536 U.S. 765 (2002). Full case and opinion authored by Justice Scalia available at

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/536/765/
30

558 U.S. 310 (2010). Full case and opinion authored by Justice Kennedy available at

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/558/08-205/
31

Brennan Center For Justice, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: What Does the Decision Mean? New York

University School of Law (2002). Available at https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/republican-partyminnesota-v-white-what-does-decision-mean
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issues32. The Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision, held that the First Amendment applied to judicial
campaign code, thus ruling that Minnesota’s announce clause was in violation and
unconstitutional33. Moreover, in the Court’s rationale they held that the traditional sense of
judicial impartiality is the requirement of a judge to not favor a party in a case, and showing
partiality towards an issue does not violate that34.
The decision in White has had a considerable effect on state elections35. Judicial
candidates are now able to speak in a more partisan fashion, with less fear of reprimand from
state judicial standards commissions or state bars36. This has made state judicial elections more
politicized, because candidates can now engage in divisive political speech to attract votes37.
With this increase in politicization it is now more likely that unqualified candidates will run for
election38. Potential candidates that may be great judges could be dissuaded from running due
to the large cost and effort needed to win these highly political elections39. Due to this, it gives
other potentially less qualified, but more popular individuals a greater opportunity to campaign
32

Ibid.

33

Ibid. at 29.
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Ibid.
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Louis Alfred Trosch, Sr. and Ronald A. Madsen, The Effect of Minnesota v. White on Campaigning for the

Judiciary, Vol. 39, Business Law Review. Available at http://www.ctklawyers.com/wpcontent/uploads/LAT2.pdf.pdf
36
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and win elections40. Additionally and perhaps the biggest impact that the White decision has
had, is on the increase in money being contributed from interest groups to campaigns41. Since
judicial candidates are now free to comment on policy issues, this gives interest groups an
incentive to elicit responses from candidates to see which candidate supports their interests,
thus likely receiving their contributions42.
While the White case only impacts judicial elections, Citizens United has had a profound
effect on elections of all types, but the most severe impact of this case may be felt in state
judicial elections43. Prior to this decision, there were long-standing federal bans on corporate
independent expenditures in elections44. In this case, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of these bans, and the bans on “electioneering communications”45. In a tight 54 decision, the Court struck down the regulations on free speech, as they were ruled to be in
violation of the First Amendment46. This effectively held that political spending is a form of
speech protected under the First Amendment, and the government may not keep organizations

40

Ibid.

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.
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Adam Skaggs, Buying Justice: The Impact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections. Brennan Center for Justice, New

York University School of Law. Available at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn=1
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(corporations, unions, and non-profit organizations) from spending money to support or
oppose candidates in elections, so long as it comes in the form of independent expenditures47.
Justice Kennedy in writing the majority opinion further asserted that corporations as
associations of individuals have speech rights under the First Amendment (2010, p.33)48. In
addition, the Court stated that there is no such thing as too much free speech and this decision
will not enhance the perception of corruption in elections (2010, p. 44)49. In authoring a strong
dissent, Justice Stevens voiced the disapproval of this decision saying “At a time when concerns
about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch... the Court today unleashes
the floodgates of corporate and union general treasury spending in these races” (2010, p. 176)
50

.
The Citizens United decision did not directly affect any state law. However, twenty-four

states that had laws restricting corporate spending in judicial elections have subsequently
called into question the constitutionality of these laws51. Since 2010, many states have repealed
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Carmen Lo, Katie Londenberg, David Nims, Joanna K. Weinberg, Spending in Judicial Elections: State Trends in the
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their laws prohibiting independent expenditures by corporations, with Ohio being one of those
states52.
White allowed for candidates to engage in political speech, which triggered an increase
in campaign contributions. Citizens United then removed the limits on campaign contributions
in elections, further contributing to the increase in spending in judicial elections. These two
cases have drastically changed the landscape of judicial elections, which made it essential to
delve into them to better understand the current environment surrounding those elections.
Now that these cases have been discussed, it is an appropriate time to examine the data
regarding money in judicial elections.
Money in Judicial Elections
As judicial elections have become increasingly politicized, they have also become more
competitive53. In 1980, 4.3 percent of incumbents running in nonpartisan elections were
defeated, while in 2000, 8 percent of incumbents were defeated running in these same
elections54. Partisan elections in 1980 had 26.3 percent of incumbents defeated, but by 2000,
the loss rate for incumbents in these elections rose to 45.5 percent55. Due to this continuing
trend, it has led to the skyrocketing of spending in judicial elections56 Keep in mind that the

52
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Ibid. at 5.
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Citizens United case was decided in 2010, so I will examine figures that were collected both
before and after this decision.
Campaign fundraising for state supreme court candidates has more than doubled in the
last two decades, going from $83.3 million in 1990-99 to $206.9 million in 2000-0957. This can
be observed by viewing figure 1 below. During that same time period, candidates in partisan
elections raised the most money at $153.8 million nationally, compared with $50.9 million in
nonpartisan elections, and $2.2 million for merit selections58. Additionally fueling the increase
in spending was television advertising. From 2000-2009, $93.6 million was spent on television
advertising, which is viewed as an effective tool for name recognition and attacking opposing
candidates59. Some of the largest contributors to campaigns in 2000-09 were business groups,
lawyers and lobbyists, and political parties. Business groups contributed $62.6 million (30
percent of total contributions), Lawyers and lobbyists contributed $59.3 million (28 percent of
total contributions), and political parties contributed $22.2 million (11 percent of total
contributions)60. A breakdown of all sectors that contributed during those years is shown in
Figure 3.
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James Sample, Adam Skaggs, Jonathan Blitzer, Linda Casey, The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 2000-2009:

Decade of Change. Justice at Stake Campaign, Brennan Center for Justice, and the National Institute on Money in
State Politics, August 2010. Available at
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Total spending in state supreme court races for 2011-12 was slightly lower at $56.4
million, compared to total spending in 2007-08 which was $57.1 million61. However, spending
by special-interest groups and political parties on television ads and other electioneering rose
to unprecedented levels62. Special-interest groups alone spent a record $15.4 million on
television ads, surpassing the previous record of $9.8 million spent by special-interest groups in
2003-0463. Moreover, in 2011-12 the record for total spending on television ads was also
surpassed. In the 2011-12 cycle $33.7 million was spent on television ads, far exceeding the
previous two year record of $26.6 million set in 2007-0864. This data can be viewed from the
chart below showing total spending on television ads from 2001-12. Lastly, non-candidate
spending as a portion of total spending also rose to a new level in the 2011-12 cycle. It was
approximately $24 million, which exceeded the previous record of $14.4 million set in 2003-04,
which is also displayed below65. These figures show the large impact that the Citizens United
decision has had on judicial elections, highlighting the record increases in spending by outside
groups as a result of this.
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III: Data and Methods
The next section of this project will be an empirical analysis of state supreme court
candidate fundraising between Ohio and Florida. The independent variables will be selection
methods, with partisan elections being Ohio and merit selections being Florida. Candidate
fundraising, which is the amount of money a candidate raises during their campaign (including
contributions received from outside sources), will serve as the dependent variable in this
analysis. I will take a quantitative approach by first examining candidate fundraising between
each state from the period of 2000-08, and then examine how the states compared in
candidate fundraising for the 2011-12 election cycle.
Data will be collected primarily from the two prominent reports that have been cited
throughout this project. Both reports are collaboration projects authored by the Justice at Stake
Campaign, Brennan Center for Justice, and the National Institute on Money in State Politics70.
Additional data will be collected from the National Institute on Money in State Politics Follow
the Money website. I expect the results from this analysis to show that more money was raised
in Ohio’s partisan elections, compared to Florida’s merit system retention elections over a span
of twelve years. This comparative analysis will strengthen existing research regarding the
differences in amounts raised between judicial selection methods.
IV: Results

70

Ibid. at 57 and 61.
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The first relationship examined was a comparison of the fundraising efforts of state
supreme court candidates from 2000-08 in both states. During that period in Ohio, there were
twenty-seven total candidates running in twelve different races. The 2000 Ohio election had
five candidates running in two races, which raised a total of $3.3 million. In 2002 there were
four candidates running in two races, raising $6.2 million. The 2004 election was the most
expensive in that time period at $6.3 million, consisting of eight candidates running in four
races. The 2006 election had six candidates running in two races, raising $2.8 million. Finally in
2008, there were four candidates running in two races, which raised $2.4 million71. The total
amount raised in Ohio during this period was $21.2 million72.
Florida’s Supreme Court elections during this period were significantly different. There
were eleven candidates running in eleven races, but the total amount raised was only $7,50073.
This entire amount was raised in the 2000 election, which had three judges up for retention
that year. In 2002, two judges were up for retention and raised $0. The election in 2004 had
two judges also up for retention, and raised $0. Similarly in 2006, there were three judges
facing a retention election, in which $0 was raised. Lastly in 2008, one judge faced a retention
election and raised $074. The graph below displays the enormous difference in money raised
during the period of 2000-08.
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The second relationship examined was how the two states compared in the 2011-12
election cycle, which was the first election following the Citizens United decision. Ohio had eight
Supreme Court candidates running in three races, raising a total of $3.4 million75. This cycle was
the most expensive election Florida has ever held for a Supreme Court seat, with an amount
totaling $1.5 million from three judges in three retention elections76. This was a highly
politicized retention election, which contributed to the drastic increase in fundraising from
outside sources, made possible by the Citizens United decision77. This election in Florida also
demonstrated that retention elections, which were previously believed to be removed from
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77
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politics, may also be following the trend of increasing politicization as a result of the Citizens
United decision78. The results of this analysis can be observed in the graph below.

State

2011-12 State Supreme Court Fundraising

2011-12 Election
Florida

Ohio

$0

$1,000,000

$2,000,000

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

Amount Raised

The last graph combines the data used in the previous two graphs, and adds in the amount
raised in 2010 to show how the states compared over the entire twelve years. In 2010 Ohio had five
candidates running in three races, raising $2.9 million total79. There were four judges running in
retention elections in Florida that year, in which $0 was raised80. This graph illustrates the impact that
Citizens United had on Florida’s retention elections.
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V: Conclusion
The two analyses conducted in this project exhibit that more money was raised in Ohio’s
Supreme Court races compared to Florida’s. While this research only compared two states, the
analyses conducted in this project were examining six different election cycles over a period of
twelve years, which is an adequate period of time to draw conclusions from. During these
twelve years, judicial elections experienced two landmark Supreme Court decisions that
dramatically changed the landscape of judicial campaigning.
The first decision in White started the trend for increased politicization of judicial
elections by allowing judicial candidates to engage in partisan speech while campaigning. By
candidates being able to openly favor or oppose issues, this gives interest groups and other

26

outside parties an added incentive to contribute to the candidate that best supports their
interests, essentially fueling the flow of contributions. Years later when the Citizens United
decision was handed out, judicial elections really started taking their present-day structure. This
decision struck down federal bans on independent corporate expenditures, which has
subsequently led to most states repealing their own state law bans on these expenditures as
well. The impact of this decision has been profound, as several spending records have since
been taken to new levels by special-interest groups seeking to influence state supreme court
elections. The two states analyzed in this project accurately reflect and illustrate the growing
importance of money in judicial elections, while also empirically showing that more money was
raised in Ohio, a state with partisan elections, compared to Florida, which uses the merit
system.
Candidate fundraising from 2000-08 in Ohio totaled $21.2 million, while only $7,500 was
raised over that same time period in Florida. The difference between the amounts raised in
both states was substantial and extremely significant. Additionally when the 2011-12 election
cycles between the two states were compared and analyzed, two important findings emerged.
The first finding showed the effects of the Citizens United decision, which led to Florida setting
a new record for spending in a Supreme Court election at $1.5 million. The second finding was
another continuation of Ohio Supreme Court candidates raising more money than those
involved in retention elections in Florida. Ohio candidates raised a total of $3.4 million in that
cycle, making the difference in amounts raised approximately $1.9 million.
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When the 2010 election cycle was included to show how the states compared over the
entire twelve year span, Ohio raised significantly more money. In five out of the seven elections
analyzed, Florida judges running in retention elections raised a total of $0. Over the entire
twelve years analyzed in this project, Ohio Supreme Court candidates raised approximately
$27,500,000, while Florida candidates raised a total of $1,507,500.
This project only directly compares two states, so there are certainly some limitations
and other avenues available for future research on this topic. One limitation is the latest data
analyzed in this project is for the 2011-12 election cycle, which omits figures from the most
recent judicial elections that occurred in 2014. Moreover, this project does not analyze any
amounts raised by candidates running in nonpartisan elections. Future research could compare
different states, and possibly compare the amounts rose using a three-state study, with each
state having a different selection method. In conclusion, the findings in this project substantiate
that more money was raised in Ohio, a state with partisan elections, than Florida which uses
the merit system. Thus showing the differences in amounts raised between the various
methods of judicial selection at the state level.
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